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CASE NOTES
Criminal Procedure-ENTRAPMENT--Sale v. Ford, 276 N.W.2d 178
(Minn. 1979).
A criminal defendant may use the defense of entrapment when officers
or agents of the government have induced the commission of a crime for
the purpose of instigating criminal prosecution against the defendant.'
The Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently followed the majority
approach in holding that entrapment exists when officers have lured the
defendant into committing a crime that defendant was not predisposed
to commit.2 The court reaffirmed its position in State v. Ford3 and elabo-
rated upon the various procedural applications of the entrapment de-
fense.
In Ford, an arrest warrant for defendant was issued upon the basis of
information that an unknown informant supplied to the police. 4 The
defendant was arrested after police discovered heroin in his pocket; sub-
sequent to his arrest they also discovered heroin in his apartment. 5 At
the omnibus hearing, the defense moved for suppression of the heroin,
arguing that there had been an illegal search and seizure because the
person that had supplied the heroin was also a government informant.
6
These claims could be demonstrated, defense counsel asserted, if the state
would produce the person whom defendant believed to be the infor-
mant.7 At a reopened omnibus hearing, defense counsel informed the
court that he was submitting an entrapment defense to the court for deci-
sion under the State v. Grt'/i 8 procedure, which allows defendants to elect
between submitting the entrapment issue to either the court or the jury
1. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434-35 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958);
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932) (interpreting statute). See generaly Park,
The Entrapment Controvery, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163 (1976).
2. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1978); State v. Grilli, 304
Minn. 80, 87-94, 230 N.W.2d 445, 451-54 (1975); State v. Poague, 245 Minn. 438, 443, 72
N.W.2d 620, 624-25 (1955).
3. 276 N.W.2d 178 (Minn. 1979).
4. An affidavit accompanying the application for the warrant stated that an infor-
mant associated with an agent of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration had been
at defendant's apartment within the previous 72 hours and had seen defendant in posses-
sion of heroin. Id. at 180.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The defense contended that one John Erickson, who could not be located, was the
informant and that he had given defendant the heroin to hold as security for a debt. Id.
8. 304 Minn. 80, 230 N.W.2d 445 (1975).
1
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for decision.9 If the court ruled that there was no entrapment, defendant
planned to assert his right at trial to have the jury decide the entrapment
question. 1o
The trial court denied the defense motions, finding neither entrapment
nor a due process violation.t t At trial, the entrapment issue was not
presented to the jury, although testimony was elicited suggesting that
defendant had been framed.12 The alleged informant was never pro-
duced and did not testify at trial.'3 The jury found defendant guilty
14 of
actual possession15 of the heroin on his person and of constructive posses-
sion 16 of the heroin found in his apartment. On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,' 7 finding the trial court had
ruled correctly on the entrapment issue18 and that it had not erred in
refusing to order the production of the informant as a witness.'9
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment de-
fense in Sorrells v. United States.20 In subsequent decisions, the Court con-
sistently has applied the "subjective" theory of entrapment. 21 This
approach focuses on the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime
rather than on the conduct of the government's agents. 22 Under the
9. Id. at 95-96, 230 N.W.2d at 455-56.
10. 276 N.W.2d at 181.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 181-82.
13. See id. At the omnibus hearing, the trial court refused to order the state to disclose
the informant's identity and pointed out that defendant could have subpoenaed the per-
son he believed to have been the informant. Id.
14. Id. at 182.
15. Actual possession refers to a situation in which goods are in the personal custody
of the person charged with possession. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 544 F.2d 786, 788
(5th Cir. 1977).
16. Constructive possession is the legal right to possession without actual possession
but with the elements of knowing dominion and control. See, e.g., State v. Florine, 303
Minn. 103, 105, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1975); State v. LaBarre, 292 Minn. 228, 237, 195
N.W.2d 435, 441 (1972).
Testimony was given to the effect that an unknown person delivered the heroin that
police found in Ford's apartment to the daughter of his girlfriend. The child allegedly
gave it to her mother, who put it in a dresser drawer. 276 N.W.2d at 180-81. The girl-
friend testified that both she and defendant concluded that the informant was the source
of the heroin. Defendant admitted knowing that the heroin was in the drawer but
claimed that he never touched it or exercised dominion or control over it. At trial, evi-
dence was introduced to show that the heroin in the drawer came from the same source as
the heroin that police found on defendant's person. Id. at 182.
17. 276 N.W.2d at 180.
18. Id'.
19. Id.
20. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
21. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958).
22. The test applied in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), was whether or
not the acts of the agent were such that even an otherwise law-abiding citizen could be
[Vol. 6
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"subjective" theory, a defendant found to be predisposed to commit the
crime cannot be entrapped. 23 In its most recent entrapment decision,
Hampton v. UnitedStates,24 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to
the "subjective" approach and its primary focus on the defendant's pre-
disposition.2 5 The Court held that the entrapment defense would never
be available to a defendant whose predisposition had been established.
2 6
The Supreme Court has also discussed an entrapment-related defense
based upon a due process theory. In United Slates v. Russell,27 the Court
noted that under some circumstances police conduct could be so outra-
geous as to violate an individual's right to due process despite that per-
lured into committing the crime. See id. at 448. See general4' Park, supra note 1, at 165;
Comment, Entrapment." A Cri''alDzicussion, 37 Mo. L. REV. 633, 634-35 (1972); 59 COR-
NELL L. REV. 546, 548-49 (1974).
Another approach, referred to as the "objective" theory of entrapment, was proposed
by a concurring minority in Sorretlr. See 287 U.S. at 454-55 (1932) (Roberts, J., concur-
ring). This approach focuses on the conduct of government agents rather than on the
defendant's predisposition. Since Sorrells, a minority of the Supreme Court has criticized
the "subjective" theory. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter commented that:
[i]t is wholly irrelevant to ask if the "intention" to commit the crime originated
with the defendant or government officers, or if the criminal conduct was the
product of "creative activity" of law enforcement officials ....
This test [for entrapment] shifts attention from the record and predisposi-
tion of the particular defendant to the conduct of police and the likelihood, ob-
jectively considered, that it would entrap only those ready and willing to commit
the crime. It is as objective a test as the subject matter permits, and will give
guidance in regulating police conduct that is lacking when the reasonableness of
police suspicions must be judged or the criminal disposition of the defendant
retrospectively appraised.
Id. at 382, 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
A minority of states supports the "objective" theory. See, e.g., Grossman v. State, 457
P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969); People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 591 P.2d 947, 153 Cal. Rptr.
459 (1979); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974); People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7,
210 N.W.2d 336 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-237 (1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 626:5 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 313 (Pur-
don 1973). Some federal courts also use the "objective" approach. See, e.g., United States
v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir.
1972); Green v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bueno, 447
F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973). But see United States v. Robin-
son, 539 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denid, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977) (predisposition of
defendant remains the principal test of entrapment).
23. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976); Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).
24. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
25. See id. at 489.
26. Ste id. at 490. The Ford court followed this stance in holding that "no matter how
involved the government is in inducing the commission of a crime, the defense ofentrapment
will not bar conviction if the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime." 276 N.W.2d at 182 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
27. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
19801
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son's predisposition to commit a crime.28 The Court did not, however,
describe the types of conduct that would violate due process, stating only
that government conduct would be unconstitutional if it violated "fun-
damental fairness" 29 and was "shocking to the universal sense of jus-
tice." 30
While the Minnesota court has acknowledged the entrapment defense
since 1909, 3 1 it has not outlined the procedural parameters of the defense
until recently. In Stale v. Grili,32 the court held that a defendant claim-
ing to be entrapped must elect before trial whether to have the entrap-
ment claim presented to the jury or heard and decided by the court.
3 3
The purpose of the Grili procedure is to allow a defendant to prevent the
jury from hearing evidence of prior misconduct that may be used to
prove defendant's predisposition.
34
The procedure established by Grli did not make any clear distinction
among the various aspects of the entrapment defense. Because confusion
had arisen due to the use of the term "entrapment as a matter of law"
and its application to various related but distinct defenses, 35 the Ford
court attempted to clarify the Grilli procedure by delineating the four
28. See id. at 431-32. The Court noted that "we may some day be presented with a
situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain
a conviction .... ." Id.
The Court cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), as an example of police
behavior sufficiently outrageous to warrant a due process-based defense. 411 U.S. at 432.
29. 411 U.S. at 432.
30. Id.
31. See State v. Gibbs, 109 Minn. 247, 123 N.W. 810 (1909).
32. 304 Minn. 80, 230 N.W.2d 445 (1975).
33. Id. at 95-96, 230 N.W.2d at 455. The new procedure required that:
following complaint or indictment and at a time prior to the commencement of
trial, a defendant shall elect whether to have his claim of entrapment presented
in the traditional manner as a defense to the jury, or to have it heard and de-
cided by the court as a matter of law. He shall give notice of such election to the
court and prosecution, setting forth the basis for the claim of entrapment in rea-
sonable detail. If the defendant elects to have the court hear the claim, he must
in open court or in writing waive a jury trial as to that issue. Such a matter can
be heard at a pretrial evidentiary hearing. . . . The trial court shall make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. If the court decides that de-
fendant was entrapped into the commission of the crime charged, this will be a
bar to further prosecution for that charge. The state may appeal this decision
under Minn. St. 632.11. If the court holds that there was no entrapment, the
issue is closed and defendant may not present the defense to the jury. However,
as always, the defendant pursuant to Minn. St. 632.01 has the right to appeal
from any resultant conviction with the pretrial denial of his entrapment claim a
possible ground for reversal.
In the alternative, defendant may elect to have his claim presented as a
defense to be decided by the jury.
Id.
34. See 276 N.W.2d at 183.
35. Ste id.
[Vol. 6
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entrapment-related defenses. Two defenses related to what the court
considered "true entrapment." First is the common situation in which
the entrapment issue is presented to the jury.36 In the second "true en-
trapment" situation, a defendant elects to have the court rule on the
issue prior to trial, thus waiving any consideration of entrapment by the
jury.3 7 The Ford court limited the use of the term "entrapment as a mat-
ter of law" to the third situation, which exists when evidence of entrap-
ment presented at trial is such that the court must take the issue from the
jury and rule on the matter.38 Fourth is the due process defense, a legal
defense to be decided by the court.
39
While making it clear that Gr/lh" does not permit a defendant to have
the second "true entrapment" defense decided by the court at a pretrial
hearing and then by the jury at trial if the court's decision is unfavor-
able, 40 the Ford court indicated that the entrapment-related defenses are
distinct. 4 1 Thus, a defendant may raise a due process defense prior to
trial while preserving the "true entrapment" defense for the jury.42 This
procedure allows a predisposed defendant who wishes to assert a poten-
tially unsuccessful entrapment defense to have the additional advantage
of a due process defense, which is available even to the predisposed de-
fendant.4 3 Whether or not the due process defense is successful, the de-
fendant would still be entitled to ajury decision on the entrapment issue.
The result in Ford appears to be a logical approach to a difficult defini-
tional and procedural problem.4 4 The court's attempt to clear up the
36. See id. at 182-83.
37. Id. at 183. The Grili court referred to this situation as entrapment "as a matter of
law." See 304 Minn. at 95, 230 N.W.2d at 455.
38. 276 N.W.2d at 183.
39. State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1978); set notes 23-26 supra and accom-
panying text.
40. 276 N.W.2d at 183. The court commented that:
[diefense counsel's intent may have been to have the court decide the due-process
issue at the omnibus hearing and preserve for the jury the predisposition-based
entrapment defense. However, as we indicated, at the reopened omnibus hear-
ing the court specifically asked defense counsel if he was submitting the entrap-
ment issue to the court, and defense counsel, in defendant's presence, replied that
he was and that he also wished to preserve his right to have the jury consider
entrapment. Grili does not permit the defense to have it both ways.
Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. The United States Supreme Court has never actually defined the procedural re-
quirements for the entrapment defense, though the trend appears to be that the jury
rather than the court should decide the matter. See, e.g., United States v. Burkley, 591
F.2d 903, 914-15 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1516 (1979); 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
427, 431-32 (1978). Some of the Justices, however, have expressed the opinion that the
entrapment defense should be considered by the court. See, e.g., United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
1980]
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confusion in terminology, however, may have operated to the disadvan-
tage of the defendant Ford. The trial court assumed that the defendant
had intended to submit both the "true entrapment" defense and the due
process defense to the court at the omnibus hearing.45 Accordingly, it
ruled on both defenses at that time,46 thereby precluding the defendant
from presenting any claim of entrapment to the jury at trial.
The Minnesota court has yet to address the due process defense as
385 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932)
(Roberts, J., concurring). Other courts are also in disagreement over whether the court or
the jury should consider the entrapment issue. See Ranney, The Entrapment Defense.- What
Hath the Model Penal Code Wrought?, 16 DuQ. L. REV. 157, 164 n.42 (1977-1978). The
Model Penal Code requires that the matter be submitted to the court:
Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a person prosecuted for an
offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment
shall be tried by the Court in the absence of the jury.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). A number of courts have
adopted this approach. See, e.g., Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 230 (Alaska 1969) (en-
trapment may be raised either before or during trial but the court alone decides the issue);
People v. Cushman, 65 Mich. App. 161, 165-66, 237 N.W.2d 228, 231 (1975) (entrapment
is an issue decided by the court in its supervisory role over the administration of criminal
justice). Other courts require the matter to be heard by the jury. See, e.g., State v. Mc-
Kinney, 108 Ariz. 436, 440-41, 501 P.2d 378, 383 (1972) (entrapment issue a matter for the
jury but can exist as a matter of law if evidence is uncontradicted that person was induced
to commit crime); Mullins v. State, - Ark. -, -, 580 S.W.2d 941, 942-43 (1979) (in
prosecution for delivery of cocaine, question of entrapment properly presented to jury);
State v. Baumann, 236 N.W.2d 361, 364 (Iowa 1975) (when the operative facts of entrap-
ment are disputed the issue is decided by the jury); Raymer v. City of Tulsa, 595 P.2d 810,
812 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (evidence of solicitation of another for prostitution presented
question of fact under entrapment instruction); Commonwealth v. Mott, 234 Pa. Super.
Ct. 52, 62, 334 A.2d 771, 777 (1975) (when defendant's credibility is disputed, entrapment
issue is for the jury). The latter approach has been criticized because it allows the jury to
hear the prosecutor's evidence of defendant's predisposition. See, e.g., Donnelly, Judicial
Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent tovocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1108
(1951); Comment, The Entrapment Doctrine in General Courts and Some State Comparsons, 49 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 447, 455 (1959); Comment, Entrapment By Federal Oftcers, 33 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1033, 1038 (1958); Comment, Entrapment i the Federal Courts, I U.S.F.L. REV. 177,
180 (1966); Comment, The Entrapment Defense in Kansas. Subjectivity Versus an Objective Stan-
dard, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 64, 69 (1972). The Grili procedure gives defendants the oppor-
tunity to avoid this problem by allowing them to choose between the court and the jury.
State v. Grilli, 304 Minn. 80, 95, 230 N.W.2d 445, 455 (1975); see State v. Ford, 276
N.W.2d 178, 183 (Minn. 1979).
A Texas statute allows the court to hear the entrapment defense at a pretrial hearing.
TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 28.01(9) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). One commentator has
suggested that the court could make an independent finding on the entrapment claim as a
matter of law and fact. If the court's decision is adverse to the defendant, the defendant
could then present the issue to the jury at trial. See Comment, Entrapment Under the 1974
Texas Penal Code-A Look At Some Problems the Statutory Defense Presents, 13 Hous. L. REV.
586, 610 (1976). The Ford court specifically objected to such a result. 276 N.W.2d at 183.
45. See 276 N.W.2d at 183.
46. Id.
[Vol. 6
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applied to a situation in which the government supplies a defendant with
narcotics. In the dissenting opinion in Ford, Justice Otis contended that
the case should have been remanded in order to give the defendant a
chance to prove that the heroin was provided by a government infor-
mant.47 The court declined to discuss the due process matter, however,
ruling only that the trial court had decided the issue correctly at the
omnibus hearing,48 and that the defendant, by presenting nothing more
than his uncontroverted testimony, had failed to demonstrate that he
had in fact received the heroin from a government agent.
49
The significance of Ford lies not in its reaffirmation of the majority
approach to the substantive aspects of entrapment, but in its discussion
of the procedural elements of the entrapment-related defenses. The Ford
47. Id. at 184 (Otis, J., dissenting). Justice Otis argued that:
[d]efendant was entitled to know whether or not the person he alleges furnished
him with the heroin was a government informant, since it is conceded by the
majority that if he was an informant we would be faced with a difficult due-
process question, the resolution of which might well constitute a defense to the
"actual possession" count.
I would remand for a new trial on the charge only to afford defendant an
opportunity to prove his claim that the state virtually thrust the heroin on him
for the express purpose of promptly arresting him while it was still in his posses-
sion.
Id. (Otis, J., dissenting).
48. See 276 N.W.2d at 180.
49. Id. at 184. The trial court had ruled that:
[d]efendant has offered only his testimony and the statement contained in the
search warrant affidavit that the informant had been on the premises within 72
hours prior to the arrest to support his argument of entrapment as a matter of
law. This showing, without more, does not place the obligation on the prosecu-
tion to call any witnesses to controvert defendant's testimony ...
. . . Since the Court declines to rule that the alleged conduct of the infor-
mant in the case at bar constituted entrapment as a matter of law, it follows that
the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant will not be suppressed on due
process grounds. ...
State v. Ford, No. 66449 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Jan. 3, 1977).
The defendant had argued that the search and seizure was illegal because the war-
rant was issued on the basis of information provided by a government informant who also
provided defendant with the heroin, and then used his knowledge of defendant's posses-
sion of heroin to enable police to make the arrest. See 276 N.W.2d at 180. Because the
state was not ordered to produce the alleged informant, defendant contended that he was
unable adequately to prove one of the essential elements of entrapment. See id. at 184. In
order to prove entrapment, a defendant must demonstrate by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that the criminal conduct was induced by the government. The state must then
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime. See State v. Grilli, 304 Minn. 80, 96, 230 N.W.2d 445, 456 (1975).
The Ford court commented that defendant was not trying to obtain disclosure of the
alleged informant's identity, since he claimed to know who the informant was. Instead, he
wanted the state to produce the informant so that the due process claim could be estab-
lished. 276 N.W.2d at 184. The supreme court argued that the matter could have been
handled in camera, or that defendant could have obtained a continuance in order to lo-
cate and subpoena the alleged informant. Id.
1980]
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court clarified the Grili procedure by explaining that the defendant may
present, in effect, a bifurcated defense. By defining the terms commonly
used in entrapment cases, the Ford decision has made it clear that a de-
fendant who raises both a "true entrapment" claim and an entrapment-
related due process defense may have the two issues considered sepa-
rately by the court and the jury. The court's ruling in Ford is likely to
give defense attorneys greater latitude in employing entrapment-related
defenses on behalf of their clients.
Paternity-THE RIGHT OF AN INDIGENT PUTATIVE FATHER TO
COUNSEL IN A PATERNITY ACTION-Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279
N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1979).
Illegitimate children have long been substantially equal to their legiti-
mate siblings in the primary rights of maternal inheritance and support
because of the certainty of the maternal blood tie.I Unlike the maternal
blood tie, however, paternity is difficult to prove. 2 Thus, preference for
the child of legitimate birth, whose paternity is presumed to be certain,
has long been sanctioned by law in societies in which property and status
are transferred from generation to generation through the father.3 Due
to the importance of accurately determining paternity in cases in which
the identity of the father is contested, it would appear desirable for all
1. See In re Estate of Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 337, 178 N.W.2d 714, 718 (1970)
(identity of mother usually easily established), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 903 (1971); MINN.
STAT. § 525.172 (1978) ("An illegitimate child shall inherit from his mother the same as if
born in lawful wedlock. . .. "); H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 5
(1971) ("[W]ith respect to its mother, the illegitimate has long been equal . . . to his
legitimate sibling.").
2. "Paternity practice has suffered from the old saw to the effect that 'maternity is a
matter of fact whereas paternity is a matter of opinion.' " H. KRAUSE, s'tpra note 1, at
106. See In re Estate of Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 337, 178 N.W.2d 714, 718 (1970) ("[N]o
method of proof we are now aware of exists by which fatherhood can be conclusively
established.'), appeal dtsmzssed, 402 U.S. 903 (1971). See generally Note, Paternal Inheritance
Rights of Illegitinate Children and the Problem of Proving Paternity, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1389
(1978).
3. As Justice Cardozo remarked in In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930):
Potent, indeed, the presumption [of legitimate birth] is one of the strongest and
most persuasive known to the law . . . , and yet subject to the sway of reason.
Time was, the books tell us, when its rank was even higher. If a husband, not
physically incapable, was within the four seas of England during the period of
gestation, the court would not listen to evidence casting doubt on his paternity.
The presumption in such circumstances was said to be conclusive.
Id. at 7, 170 N.E. at 472.
Today, the presumption of legitimacy is still normally given great weight. See 9 J.
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2527 (3d ed. 1940) (child born of a married woman during wedlock
presumed the child of mother's current husband).
[Vol. 6
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